

THIN ICE

**Why the UK's progressive majority
could stop Labour's landslide melting
away**

Matthew Sowemimo, Neal Lawson, and Lena Swedlow

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About this report

This report seeks to make sense of Labour's big but brittle 2024 election win. Using new polling and research it sets out the case for a progressive electoral and governing strategy. It forms the first part of a series of publications looking at how progressives can win and govern effectively. The next major report looks at how our first past the post voting system enables the rise of the populist right.

This work sits alongside our [New Settlement project](#) which sets out the vision and leading ideas to create a Good Society.

About Compass

Compass is the pressure group for a Good Society, a world that is much more equal, sustainable and democratic. We build alliances of ideas, parties and movements to help make systemic change happen. Our strategic focus is to understand, build, support, and accelerate new forms of democratic practice and collaborative action that are taking place in civil society and the economy, and to link those with state reforms and policy. The meeting point of emerging horizontal participation and vertical resource and policy we call [45 Degree Change](#).

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Summary

In 2024, after 14 years out of power, Labour won a huge parliamentary majority. But Labour is skating on very thin ice **electorally** and is in danger of accelerating the UK's political shift to the populist-right.

The way Labour has chosen to win under our electoral system undermines its ability to deliver on the infrequent occasions it gets into office, thus making effective change and re-election much less likely. Furthermore, using new polling, this report outlines that we are living in unprecedented electoral times in which voter allegiances to parties have never been weaker or more volatile. Big majorities can now be taken away as quickly as they can be given.

Under these circumstances, as our new polling shows, Labour should build on the existing but latent progressive majority in the country and win on a mandate for real change, rather than court centre-right voters on the basis of limited reforms.

Labour's volatile victory in numbers

- There were 202 seats where a progressive candidate won, but the combined vote for the Conservatives and Reform was greater than the number of votes cast for the winning candidate (of these seats, 171 were won by Labour, 26 by Lib Dems, 2 by Greens, 2 by SNP and 1 by Plaid Cymru). This leaves these seats very vulnerable to any consolidation of the right-wing vote at the next election.
- 131 Labour seats were won by a margin of fewer than 5,000 votes, with 103 secured by less than 5% of the vote.
- A 6% swing against Labour could see the party lose its majority.
- Reform came second in 98 constituencies, 89 of which are Labour-held seats, posing a significant challenge in future elections.
- The Green Party is now second in 39 seats, primarily targeting Labour strongholds.
- Record low turnout alongside substantial tactical voting characterised the 2024 election, with 4 in 10 Labour voters expressing weak or tactical support for the party.
- Labour's national vote share was 34%, marginally higher than in 2019, but the smallest for a majority-winning party in British political history.
- Vote share decreased in cities like Manchester, Birmingham, and London, with specific urban constituencies seeing sharp drops (e.g., Manchester Central -14%, Birmingham Ladywood -40%).
- Labour's vote among young and progressive demographics, particularly renters, is increasingly volatile.

Introduction

Labour is skating on thin ice. Its huge parliamentary majority conceals a precarious electoral position and the very real threat of the populist right.

By backing First Past the Post (FPTP), Labour narrows its path to power to only those moments it can win over default Tory voters. These voters tend only to back the Labour Party when the Conservative Party has proved itself unfit to govern (like 1997 and 2024) and Labour positions itself as a ‘safe bet,’ promising not to change anything that much. On the rare occasions where this is possible, only twice since 1974, Labour finds itself in office but with a weak mandate and therefore fails to deliver sufficient change. Deploying this blunt tactic to win under FPTP means it builds a cage from its victory.

Moreover, this moment in which Labour has inherited power is fiendishly challenging. British politics is in a doom loop of volatility. A complex and chaotic world makes old style economic and public service delivery hugely difficult. After the ravages of austerity, falling living standards, and in the midst of climate chaos, international volatility, a struggling and stagnating economy, and big cultural/social changes such as mass immigration, people are dejected, distrustful, and occasionally desperate. Increasingly, voters are rejecting the ‘not much change’ option, with some backing the politics of the populist right. Labour, with its lightweight ‘change’ mantra, chases these voters, feeling safe that under FPTP and the two-party duopoly it is designed to embed, there can be no genuine competition to Labour’s left.

This ‘small target’ strategy was, at one level, perfectly executed. However, the timidity of this strategy, resting almost solely on a highly particular context where simply ‘not being the Tories’ proved to be enough, is a timebomb - constraining Labour from making change happen by its self-imposed lack of a radical mandate.

Already bubbling frustration leads to an anti-establishment feeling, with votes splintering away from the two main parties. The UK has seen the percentage of votes going to two main parties decline by almost 40%. Some polls now have the two party share at little more than half the electorate. Furthermore, now that four parties are polling above 10%, FPTP causes democratic mayhem, with small movements of votes to and from parties leading to big changes in seat allocations, allowing huge but brief majorities. It makes building the long-term consensus needed to tackle the big problems of the day all but impossible.

This paper demonstrates that Labour’s parliamentary majority is based on very shallow foundations, with the party facing threats from all sides in the next general election. Our new polling reveals that **4 in 10 people who voted Labour in July 2024 either don’t identify as**

very strong supporters of the party or don't identify as supporters at all and voted for purely tactical reasons. These reluctant Labour voters could easily splinter - but our polling shows that most of them clearly want a progressive politics: when asked which party they would vote for if they had to choose another at the next election, Labour voters revealed they were overwhelmingly more likely to vote for the Lib Dems (29%), the Greens (19%) or not vote (15%), than vote for the Tories (12%) or Reform (11%).

Our data demonstrates that **Labour Together was wrong when it argued in its recent report that the greatest threat to Labour is from parties to the right.** Instead, Labour's prospects are threatened by losing its existing electoral coalition to other progressive parties and independents after failing to sufficiently change the country - and in so doing fueling the return of the Conservatives and the rise of the populist and even far-right.

But the biggest threat Labour faces is also its biggest opportunity. By electorally and programmatically working with other progressive parties it can grow its support, and secure real change for the country.

The UK has long had a progressive majority of voters. The majority of British voters in all but one election since 1979 have voted for left and centre-left political parties. But in that time the country has either been governed almost relentlessly from the right - or by Labour governments who feel they need to distance themselves from the more radical policy ideas the country needs and wants.

This is all thanks to the perverse incentives of our FPTP voting system, which itself has become increasingly unpopular with the British public. [Recent polling from YouGov](#) revealed voters back changing our voting system to proportional representation over sticking with FPTP by almost 2:1. But because FPTP gives Labour at least a narrow chance of governing alone, it refuses to back it - at least for now.

And so the doom loop of voter alienation continues, with party allegiances declining and turnout hitting one of its lowest levels since 1918 as a multi-party reality is shoe-horned into a two party system.

A key factor in this story is that at elections, the progressive majority is divided between several parties, while the right-wing vote, until now, has been consolidated around one party, which hands the right victory even when they are in a minority. At the last election, the effect of splitting that right-wing vote between two parties was clearly on show.

However, Labour does not have to wait in the wings for the right to lose and appease their voters - it can win on its own progressive terms.

Currently, driven by the logic of FPTP, Labour is caught in a Catch-22 situation: winning occasionally but only by making itself safe to centre-right voters who refuse to back the change the country needs. There is an alternative that gets the party out of its self-imposed cage. It could build and mobilise the existing but latent progressive majority in the country, allowing progressives to win on a mandate of meaningful change and thereby making future election victories more likely - **a virtuous political cycle rather than a vicious one.**

New polling by Compass clearly shows **Labour has more to gain by strengthening its appeal to progressive voters than by appeasing the right**, with 28% of Liberal Democrat voters and 21% of Green voters prepared to consider Labour as second preference. This is compared to just 4% of Reform voters and 7% of Conservative voters who would vote for Labour if they had to choose another party to back.

New polling also reveals clear public support for Labour adopting a more radical progressive policy platform, with respondents saying they would have a more positive view of Labour if they supported a suite of big change policies. This can secure Labour's electoral position in two key ways.

First, it could mobilise progressive voters and parties, who Labour can lock in by supporting proportional representation (PR) and forming the electoral basis for the long term structural changes the country needs to see.

Second, **policies to create greater equality and democratic voice could form a wedge in the Tory/Reform voting block**, winning back some voters who support redistributive democratic and economic policies.

Compass has long advocated for a progressive alliance, and Boris Johnson's 80-seat majority after the 2019 General Election made it seem inevitable that an alliance would be necessary to beat the Tories. Three things changed:

1. After a disastrous budget and with a party leadership mired in scandal, **the Tory vote unexpectedly and dramatically collapsed**, along with any confidence in the government. This suppressed the Tory vote and lots of Tory voters stayed home. **Then Reform split an already depressed right vote.**
2. Partly due to its long time in office, but also in large part due to scandals about party finances and leadership, **the SNP vote also unexpectedly collapsed in Scotland.**
3. **Labour was prepared to win on the basis of ruling out many of the changes the country needed.** It ruthlessly targeted resources at voters who might switch from Tory to Labour and won, but at the price of being insufficiently progressive, while abandoning many people and places.

In part these events show how unpredictable politics now is, how weak incumbents can be and that oppositions can win by default.

But 2024 did see a 'progressive alliance'. Through an obvious backroom deal between Labour and the Liberal Democrats, both parties stood full slates of candidates but targeted their resources only in seats they could win.

Looking forward, time will tell whether the Tories and the SNP can recover enough to threaten Labour in the next general election. Both parties have started to revive in the polls. The big problem is that in 2024, Labour won on terms that constrain its ability to deliver on its 'change' promise and the next election could see the progressive vote splinter as consequence. If the only uniting glue was to kick the Tories out, what will hold the progressive coalition together next time?

Meanwhile, an alliance could be formed between the Tories and Reform to make amends for the **202 seats** where they split the vote to the benefit of the winning progressive candidates in 2024. At a stroke, this would transform the political landscape.

The 2024 General Election was a one-off event in which unprecedented Tory ineptitude met almost unparalleled Labour discipline, but without any deep expression of what, if any, change Labour was offering. Against a backdrop of unprecedented voter volatility, to avoid losing next time and instead win on a ticket that can cement a 'decade of renewal,' Labour must:

- Mobilise the latent progressive majority that exists in the UK - this can be achieved via support for the kind of radical measures that new Compass polling shows already enjoy majority support, like upgrading older homes to be more energy efficient, bringing the water network back into public ownership, increasing taxes on wealth, removing means testing for the winter fuel allowance, switching the electoral system from first-past-the-post to proportional representation for Parliament, and abolishing the House of Lords in favour of an elected second chamber.
- Split the Reform and Tory vote, winning over those that want radical economic and democratic change.
- Work with the Liberal Democrats and Greens to ensure the progressive vote is fully utilised - especially in the 89 seats where Reform are second to Labour.
- Realise that the bedrock to long-term progressive change is a switch to proportional representation, which gives greater voice to the UK's progressive majority.

PART 1

How did Labour perform in 2024?

How did Labour perform in 2024?

In 2024, Labour returned to power after fourteen bleak years of Tory rule, with ‘rule’ being a generous term. Of course, Labour has to be commended for a ruthless and efficient campaign that saw it win its second biggest majority ever. The party showed real discipline and focus.


But, while Labour’s parliamentary majority is big, its hold on power feels weak and brittle, and its moral mandate weaker still. Labour’s overall vote share was 34%, only marginally up on the ‘disaster’ of 2019, and actually gained even fewer votes. It is the smallest vote share ever to have delivered a Commons majority.

Add to this one of the lowest levels of voter turnout since universal suffrage and record levels of tactical and protest votes, and the mandate looks weaker still. The 2024 General Election saw almost as many people taking part as not. More and more, voters are dissatisfied with our democracy, they sit out elections and express dissatisfaction through extra-parliamentary channels such as protests and demonstrations. The riots this summer and rise of the far-right is just one manifestation of this democratic decay.

Amongst those who did vote Labour, worrying trends are being uncovered. It wasn’t just that fewer people voted for Labour than at any other past win, there was a distinct shift in the make-up of Labour voters.

Only 10% of Conservative 2019 voters shifted to the Labour Party. While ‘buyers regret’ will be a feature over time, amongst those that did switch, a third already regret their vote.

Conservative to Labour switchers are the most likely to regret their vote



Source: More in Common, September 2024

34% of support - less than 20% of the whole electorate - resting on weak foundations is much less than party strategists would have hoped for or expected in the aftermath of the Truss mini-budget debacle in 2022 and the Tories shambolically betting on their own failure. It is impossible to change a country in any meaningful and sustained way with such a narrow mandate.

On a regional basis, Labour's vote stagnated in the West Midlands and South West. In the North West of England, Labour's sweep of 24 seats was achieved with a fall of 2% in its vote. As will be discussed, Labour's big city performance was weak and this was reflected in its vote in London falling by 5%. So whilst Keir Starmer takes his place alongside Tony Blair and Clement Attlee as big election winners, his popular mandate pales in comparison with both these predecessors.

Walls, Bellwethers, and Heartlands: Labour in England

Labour's loss of its longstanding constituencies in the North of England and West Midlands industrial areas (known as 'the Red Wall') in the 2019 General Election was a major preoccupation of the leadership. Labour won back all but one of the Red Wall seats: Ashfield, where Lee Anderson retained his seat after defecting from the Conservatives to Reform.

But Labour's vote share in these constituencies rose by just 3%. Its actual vote tally in the 31 Red Wall seats that it recaptured actually dropped. They won these seats because they were not the Tories, because Tory voters stayed at home and because Reform split the regressive vote. Labour can't rely on this happening again.

Labour's Red Wall victories were the direct result of huge swings from the Conservatives to the Reform Party. Key examples are Stoke On Trent Central where Reform increased its vote by 19%; Heywood and Middleton, where Reform saw an increase of 15% and Bury North, 13%. In Bolsover, on the disused Derbyshire coalfield, Labour overturned a Tory majority of 5,000 despite adding only 600 votes to its tally of 17,000, compared to 10,900 for the Tories and just over 9,000 for Reform. Similarly in Dudley in the Black Country, Labour emerged victorious with just 12,000 votes on a 51 per cent turnout; the Tories were reduced to 10,300, while Reform took 9,400. In 2019 the turnout in this seat was 59%. In Rother Valley in 2024, Labour's Jake Richards won only an additional 500 votes compared to his Labour predecessor in the constituency and on a turnout that fell by 4%.

These are just a few of the **202 seats** across the UK where the total vote for the right was larger than support for the winning progressive candidate, but the right vote split, making them 'regressive tragedies'.

171 of these seats are held by Labour; an average 5.2% swing away from Labour would be enough for the best-placed challenger to win (Reform in 45 seats, the Conservatives in 157 seats).

Labour also needed to recapture the classic southern English marginals that have decided election outcomes for more than forty years - some of the classic bellwether seats. These seats have substantial numbers of middle income voters who are owner occupiers and work in service industries. Labour's vote share amongst people with a mortgage increased from 33% in 2019 to 39% in 2024. Labour increased its vote amongst social grade C1 voters from 32% to 36% compared to the 2019 election. Good examples of southern marginals are both Swindon seats and Harlow which Labour recaptured but narrowly. Labour's vote in the Southeast of England was only 24%, much lower than Tony Blair's vote share at the height of his successes - 32%. In these constituencies, Labour's vote increased by only 5% or less:

- Southampton Itchen
- East Thanet
- Gloucester
- Wycombe
- Hastings
- Crawley
- Northampton North

Labour did win the seats it needed in the South of England - but only just.

Labour's relatively weak performance in southern marginals makes these seats very vulnerable to even small swings in 2029 or a further fall in electoral turnout. In seats like Portsmouth North (Labour majority 1.8%), even a small loss of votes to the Green Party or Liberal Democrats at the next election would see the Conservatives win the seat next time around.

Whilst voters in these seats will likely have their future attitudes to Labour determined by the cost of living and the overall state of the economy, other policy areas deserve attention here. The big rise in young people renting makes rent rises in the southern marginals just as important as mortgage rate levels. In Swindon, rents have risen by 10% in the last year. These areas also have weakened public services ranging from long waits for special educational needs support to long waits in Accident and Emergency. Labour in these areas will be judged on its performance both in terms of perceived public service improvements and critical living standards.

Labour also received a clear warning from its traditional big city heartlands. Labour had piled up votes in the conurbations in the 2015, 2017 and 2019 general elections. However, in July 2024, Labour saw falls in its votes in a number of big city seats such as:

- Birmingham Ladywood -40%
- Manchester Central -14%
- Manchester Rusholme -26%
- Sheffield Central -14%
- Lewisham North -12%
- Newcastle East -9%
- Edmonton -8%

One of the factors pulling down Labour's big city vote was the rise of the 'Gaza protest' independents. Birmingham Perry Barr was lost by Labour to a Gaza candidate. Birmingham Hall Green and Hodge Hill saw large independent candidate votes, as did Bethnal Green and Stepney. Labour's vote amongst Muslims [fell by 28% in the election](#). Wes Streeting, Shabana Mahmood and Jess Phillips in big city seats all came close to losing as Labour swept to power nationally. Independent candidates also finished in second place in Birmingham Ladywood and Bradford West. The 'Gaza factor' may not be in play in quite the same way at the next election, but [some analysis suggests the war could just be an accelerator of long term trends that show Labour losing previously strong voting groups such as Muslims](#).

However, Labour experienced big vote reductions even in inner city seats that had a small Muslim population. Seats like Liverpool Riverside and Newcastle East saw sharp falls in the Labour vote and 75% of Labour incumbents, a large portion of which represent cities, had a turnout below the national average. In London, [38% of Black people and 33% of Asian Londoners live in poverty](#). In Birmingham, [48% of children live in poverty](#). Big city voters, like other parts of Labour's coalition are also 'change voters' who want to see an improvement in their social circumstances.

Our new polling reveals that **4 in 10 people who voted Labour in July 2024 are either not very strong supporters of the party or not supporters at all and only voted for Labour tactically.**

Given this, Labour would be making a big political error if it assumes all of its voters will continue to support the party regardless of its record. Labour had big vote margins in its Scottish seats in 2010 and in Red Wall seats as recently as 2015. However, by the time two election cycles were over these seats were lost. Electoral change now happens slowly and then very quickly. Labour has to be ready to face other insurgent campaigns from independents. The July result shows that well-networked independents can draw considerable votes from Labour.

Labour's vote share also fell in a series of university towns. Labour's unexpectedly good performance in 2017 was in part built on its success in winning university towns with high numbers of students and graduate voters. However, in 2024, Labour's vote fell sharply in university constituencies, key examples being:

- Exeter -9%
- Canterbury -7%
- Reading Central -4%
- Birmingham Edgbaston -8%
- Oxford East -7%

Another key driver of Labour's falling support was increasing support for the Green Party. The Greens increased their vote in Reading Central by 11% and by 12% in Canterbury. One of the features of university towns is that they have numbers of highly networked voters. This means that effective campaigns, whether instigated by a political party or otherwise, can generate immense traction.

More worryingly for the future, when polled after the election, 17% of 2024 Labour voters say they regret their vote and [almost a quarter of Labour voters reported they would consider voting for the Green Party](#). More than a quarter of Labour voters reported their vote was [tactical or a protest vote](#). If so much of Labour's vote is fragile, motivated by reasons that are more to do with other parties that Labour can't control, Labour has to work hard to retain those votes and increase its vote share to ensure a majority at the next election.

The performance of Labour in the Red Wall, the bellwether seats, and its heartlands is a complicated picture, and charting a way forward to grow its voting coalition is fraught with gambles and trade-offs. However, looking at the longer story of elections and our new polling shows two things - this voter churn is part of a long trend of increasing volatility, and Labour's path forward lies in progressive change.

PART 2

2024 in context

A decade of upheaval and volatility

The 2015 Scottish General Election results were the first indicator of a major disruption to traditional existing party alignments when Labour lost all but 1 of its 41 Scottish seats to the Scottish National Party. Labour's hold on Scotland, which had lasted generations, was decimated. The upsurge in the support for Scottish Independence decisively broke old political alignments, and with it the role of Labour in Scotland as the de facto centre-left progressive party.

The 2016 European Referendum saw Labour heartlands in the North of England vote against Labour policy, and vote to Leave the European Union in large numbers. The large Leave vote was a major surprise given prior opinion polling. Much has been written about this particular referendum - its relevance here is the way it politically cleaved apart Labour and its historic base of working class Northern English voters. That has been fixed in 2024 - but only with string and glue. If Labour delivers it could be solidified, or it could fall apart, possibly for good, if this second chance is wasted.

The 2017 election saw a big and surprising increase in the Labour vote to 40%, with the Tories squandering a 21-point lead. Smaller parties, namely the Liberal Democrats, the SNP, and the Greens, saw their vote share go down. At the time, some heralded this as the "return of two-party politics". However, this interpretation misses a huge rise in the idea of a "Progressive Alliance" and tactical voting to keep the Tories out amid an incredibly unpopular Brexit process and the effects of austerity. Mass tactical voting was now to be a big feature of all future elections.

In May 2019, the European Parliament elections saw the Tories win a tiny 8.8% of the vote. Nigel Farage's Brexit Party won 30% and became the largest single national party in the European Parliament. A little over six months later, the Conservatives won a landslide built on seats captured from Labour, some of which they hadn't won in over a hundred years, such as Leigh, on a 12% swing. After this election, some commentators thought that the loss of the Red Wall to the Conservatives prefigured a stable realignment of traditional working class voters away from Labour.

With hindsight, we can view these shifts not as some long-term realignment but [a symptom of increased electoral volatility](#). These huge fluctuations in power do not necessarily correlate to huge fluctuations in vote share - instead they are a factor of our electoral and party system. For example, at the height of support for the SNP, Westminster's voting system facilitated the SNP's absolute decimation of Labour's hold on its historic stronghold. The SNP received 50% of votes cast in Scotland, and 95% of the seats. With almost a quarter of the votes, Labour held one seat. In our current circumstances of

four parties winning more than 10% of the vote, we have a multi-party system being pushed through a system designed for just two. FPTP becomes chaotic and unpredictable in such circumstances, as tiny movements in one party's share of the vote can lead to wild fluctuations in how every party's seats are allocated. This mechanical seat volatility is then overlaid with questions of legitimacy, as parties win individual seats on far less than 50% of the vote and the governing party does the same. So, rather than delivering stable majorities and secure politics, we are dealing with immense political upheaval at and between elections. Hung parliaments in 2010 and 2017 and five different Prime Ministers in 14 years speak to this volatility.

In 2024, Labour's only solid resurgence was in Scotland, where it won back 36 seats. Labour's vote in Scotland increased by 16% and was the result of an almost direct transfer of votes from the Scottish National Party to Labour. While the SNP is now almost back to the level of parliamentary representation that it had before the 2014 referendum, it is once again leading Labour in polls. The outcome of the Holyrood election in 2026 will be as instructive as it is uncertain.

It's also worth noting that when we think about the topics, narrative, and motivations behind this electoral churn of the last 15 years, the issues that stand out are immigration, Brexit, economic instability and the cost of living, the disastrous effect of the coalition on the reputation of the Lib Dems, and Scottish Independence. With the exception of Scottish Independence, the right has largely owned and led the narrative and relevant policy on all these major points.

If that continues, a 172-seat majority is of little long-term value if Kemi Badenoch's Conservatives and the five Reform MPs set much of the terms of debate for the next five years. Safe majorities are no longer a guarantee of stable politics. It is the nature and depth of mandates that matter, and the ability to govern effectively - as Boris Johnson found out after 2019.

Though this series of tumultuous upheavals in British politics is the context for the 2024 election, this last election stands out as a particularly skewed and brittle result.


This was the most disproportionate election ever, with Labour awarded 64% of the seats on only 34% of the vote.

It was also the first where four parties received more than 10% of the vote. The perversities of FPTP mean that, at a constituency level, seats were won on paper-thin margins, and the winning "majorities" were comparatively very small.

For Labour particularly, the distribution of their vote and performance in individual constituencies showed high levels of weakness and longer term vulnerability.

Nearly one in three Labour seats (131 in total) were won by margins of less than 5,000 votes, with 103 of these victories secured by margins of less than 5%, such as Hendon, Poole and Derbyshire Dales. In seats where Labour started in second place to the Conservatives by between 10% and 20%, the party's vote only rose by 5%.

A tenth of Labour held constituencies were won on vote shares of 35% or less, such as Wycombe, Stoke on Trent South, Slough, Norfolk South and Norfolk Southwest. This kind of minority win was once rare but is now alarmingly common, as shown in [the graph](#) below.



All of this adds up to mean that despite Labour's considerable seat haul, a swing of just 6% could see Labour lose its majority.

This raises two main concerns. Firstly, assuming Labour's unpopularity rises after a hard few years in government and it fights the next election defending its record, where does the Labour vote go in the next election? Secondly, how can Labour prevent any steep losses and build a dependable electoral coalition when the situation is so volatile?

PART 3

Looking ahead

The threat to Labour from all sides

The Conservatives are down, but they are not out. They remain the formal Opposition, and with the exception of the last few years, are the most successful election-winning political party in UK, if not global, history. It is too early to tell what impact their new leader will have, but there has been no civil war, the party hasn't splintered and a number of recent polls have given them a lead over Labour for the first time since 2022, one with Reform only 3% behind the Government.

According to research done by More In Common, assuming no other changes, the Conservative routes back to power are fairly clear. If they choose to shift right or team up with Reform, this could push some Labour- or Lib Dem- leaning voters away, but could still see a return to 265 seats and Labour losing 130+ seats and returning with 277 MPs.


The path to victory

More in Common has modelled approximately how many seats the Conservatives could win if they expanded their voter base by attracting voters from the right.

The risk of appealing purely to Reform voters is that this could deter the other pools of current and potential Conservative voters.

Even if the Conservatives manage to reverse two thirds of the 2019-2024 Conservative to Labour swing, pursuing a strategy of 'uniting the right' could keep the Conservatives in second place at the next election.

This is based on how many Reform voters say they are likely to vote Conservative next time, how many Conservatives say they would never vote Reform and who they would vote for instead. Assuming no other changes in votes or turnout.



Another scenario for the Tories is to 'defend the centre' - winning back 25% of Liberal Democrat voters could deliver a Conservative majority. When you consider only 42% of 2024 Liberal Democrat voters reported they identify as supporters of the party - with 28% of these voters reporting that they were not a supporter but voted for tactical or protest reasons - these numbers do not seem insurmountable.

The path to victory


More in Common has also modelled approximately how many seats the Conservatives could win if they expanded their voter base by taking votes from the Liberal Democrats.

A strategy that pulls voters back from Labour and the Liberal Democrats may give the Conservatives the best chance of regaining power at the next election.

This would give the Conservative's a bare majority, more seats than under a purely unite the right strategy - but not enough over the longer term.

Instead, a combined approach of reaching Reform and centrist voters is needed to restore the Conservative Party as a governing coalition.

This is based on how many Liberal Democrat voters say they are likely to vote Conservative next time, and how many Conservatives say they would never vote Liberal Democrat. Assuming no other changes in votes or turnout.



If the Tories can build broad appeal in the face of an unpopular Labour government, win back 25% of Liberal Democrat voters, reverse just half of the 2024 swing to Labour, and win back a third of Reform voters, they reduce Labour to their 2019 levels of support. This might be a tall order, but in these volatile times it's possible.

Even if we assume that the Conservatives can't manage that and Reform's base holds firm or grows, despite its massive parliamentary group, Labour still isn't in the clear. It's true, Labour could afford to lose a lot of seats and still clinch another term in office. But its vote share cannot stand still - it has to grow it.

Can Labour win again with more of the same?


Over the long-term the Labour voter base is fracturing, and the thin margins and decreasing winning vote shares mean Labour's seat majority does not provide a safety net for the next election. Especially given the volatility of our voting system now, a number of factors could accelerate a Conservative comeback in ways that endanger Labour's chance of a second term.

The negative incumbency factor is now big. Across western democracies, governments are struggling to be re-elected because the complexities of delivery are now so great and because of inflation. Voters turn away faster than ever from parties in office in the search for big change solutions. In analysis released after Trump's re-election, [the FT showed](#) "every governing party facing election in a developed country this year lost vote share, the first time this has ever happened".

Every governing party facing election in a developed country this year lost vote share, the first time this has ever happened

Rise/fall in vote share for governing parties in national elections (% pts), by year

● Individual election ● US 2024



Excludes years where fewer than five countries had elections

FT graphic: John Burn-Murdoch / @jburnmurdoch

Sources: [ParlGov](#), FT research

©FT

If current polling persists then Labour's sister party in Germany, the SPD, from whom Labour said it had learnt a lot, could be out of office in February 2025.

Much harder to track and predict, but still a significant factor in the possibility of a Conservative return is a depression of anti-Tory tactical voting. Given that globally all governing political parties in developing democracies are struggling to defend their record, we can expect Labour's popularity to fall before the next election. Without the anger and resentment toward the Conservative government to galvanise progressive tactical voting, this could further jeopardise Labour's next result, particularly when more than a fifth of 2024 Labour voters and more than 1 in 4 of Lib Dem voters were tactical votes.

Labour's weakest flank could be its hold on the 'Red Wall'. As discussed, Labour's successes in its traditional heartlands weren't down to increases in its vote - that either stayed the same or fell. The 2024 election did little to overcome Labour's weakness with traditional working class communities in England. Reform is already coming for Labour, and with Trump's win emboldening the right with legitimacy and resources, it is reasonable to expect a significant fight in Labour-held seats. Any increase in Reform's vote, or deal done to consolidate the regressive vote between Farage and Badenoch, will significantly threaten Labour's majority.

Meanwhile, Labour's progressive flank is exposed - particularly by the Greens. Labour could lose southern marginals with quite small increases in the Green or Liberal Democrat vote, even if the Conservatives are not rising in popularity. Seats like Cambridgeshire North West, Chatham, Dartford, Dorset South, Lowestoft, Norfolk South West, Suffolk Coastal, Southend West and Reading West are all

highly vulnerable in these circumstances.

Whilst Labour only lost one constituency to the Green Party - Bristol Central - the Greens saw a big increase in their vote in a series of Labour-held seats including Huddersfield, Bristol South and the two Hackney seats. Labour lost a significant 10% of its 2019 vote to the Green Party. The Greens won 14% of the vote in the 18-25 age grouping, up by 12%, traditionally Labour's strongest supporters. The seats where the Greens won saw nearly a 70% turnout. This is a warning to Labour given how mobilised the Green Party and its campaigning could be in the future.

The Greens are now second in 40 constituencies, with all but one facing Labour. Of the 219 seats where Labour won and the Conservatives came second, the Greens increased their vote by more than 16 times on average. In places like Hastings and Rye, the Green vote went from just 33 in 2019 to 5,761 in 2024. The Greens now average nearly 3,000 votes in these constituencies, comparable to the average Liberal Democrat vote. At the general election, 45% of the More In Common 'Progressive Activists' grouping of Labour voters who voted Labour [have considered voting Green at some point](#).

In 126 of these 219 seats, the combined Conservative and Reform vote was greater than the winning Labour vote. With Reform averaging nearly 8,000 votes in these seats, and the Greens on the rise, Labour's average majority of 3,500 votes appears increasingly fragile.

But it's not just the electoral maths that changes the game for the Greens; they are now a much stronger force in British politics than they were a few years ago, and thereby present a greater threat to Labour. Not only does the party now have a stronger national platform in the House of Commons, but it also has a growing grassroots base. The Greens now have 800 local councillors. Some of this local government strength is concentrated, such as in Bristol where they are the largest party on the council. However, the Greens are also the largest party on Hastings and Stroud councils - both with Labour MPs. The Greens now have a strong springboard to challenge Labour from the left - especially if Labour fails on the delivery of progressive policies. A rise in the Green Party's support may not win the Greens many more members of parliament but it could lose Labour many southern English and possibly city seats.

When polled in November 2024, 40% of Labour's 2024 voters said they were not a strong supporter of the party - 12% were not a supporter and voted for them tactically or as a protest vote, and 28% were not a strong supporter. The party with the highest percentage of their voters reporting they actually supported the party they voted for was Reform UK, with 73% of its voters rating themselves a supporter - and more than double the number (29%) of Reform voters rating themselves as very strong supporters than Labour voters (12%).

Labour therefore cannot afford a further erosion of support at the next election, and somehow needs to keep both socially liberal and socially conservative voters on board at a moment when it is their record that's being judged, not the totally inept record of the last Tory administration.

Labour's parliamentary term should be viewed as a long campaign - the party has not been given a mandate so much as time, a chance to prove it can deliver sufficient 'change'. [Labour and its strategists clearly know this.](#) But does Labour's mandate provide the platform for sufficient change?

[The tests used to assess them will be NHS waiting lists, immigration, and perhaps of greatest importance, the cost of living.](#)

Four to five years isn't long, especially when post-Budget OBR growth and living standards are both projected to be minimal for this parliament.

We only need to look across the Atlantic to see what happens when, despite arguably strong progressive domestic and economic policy-making, centre-left governments fail to address the sense of economic pessimism and distrust of politics.

The steady drift to the right now feels relentless. The populist right sets the ideological agenda, Labour moves with them, assuming this is where key swing Tory voters are and believing that there is no effective competition in the space they leave behind. Kemi Badenoch's appointment brings her talking points into the mainstream, lending Reform legitimacy and political oxygen.

Trump's re-election turbo-charges the right's momentum, but our voting system also accelerates this race to the right. Under FPTP, the building blocks of parliament are seats - not votes - and so the seat-winner issues decide, not what the majority of people actually think.

In turn, the effort to appease more right-wing voters leads Labour to abandon exactly those policies that could see them address some of the structural issues driving the rise of the far-right such as inequality and in-work poverty. If Labour fails, anti-establishment and anti-politics sentiment only grows.

Yes, to win again part of Labour's electoral coalition will have to include some people who have voted Tory before. But if even the worst election for the Conservatives of all time only sees 10% of 2019 Conservative voters willing to vote Labour, one has to wonder how stable that support is and whether Labour can grow its voter base further to the right and how any such move would leave its left exposed.

Left or lose

Instead of occasionally winning weak and fragile electoral victories by focusing on default Tories, Labour should look to mobilise the latent progressive majority in this country, who could be galvanised by a progressive policy offer.

Of those who voted Labour in July, more are likely to break towards progressive parties (19% Green, 29% Liberal Democrat - total 48%) than right wing parties (11% Reform, 12% Conservative - total 23%). Labour should therefore be less concerned about losing voters to Reform and the Tories than to the Liberal Democrats and the Greens, and should be wary of any panicked swerves to the right to stop people jumping ship for Reform and the Tories.

If Labour wants to grow its voter base at the next election, Compass polling suggests any new support is much more likely to come from other progressive parties than the Tories and Reform. Just 4% of Reform voters would vote for Labour if they had to choose another party to vote for, and just 7% of Conservative voters.

Progressive voters were the most likely to choose to vote Labour, with 28% Liberal Democrat voters reporting Labour as a second choice, and 21% of Green voters.

This data demonstrates that Labour Together was wrong when it argued in [its recent report](#) that the greatest threat to Labour is from parties to the right.

This shows how much more is to be gained by Labour appealing to progressive voters - who are much more open to voting Labour on progressive terms - than right-wing voters on more regressive terms.

If Liberal Democrat voters are between 4 and 7 times and Green voters 3 and 5 times more likely to vote for you than Conservative and Reform voters, what is the electoral sense in courting those right leaning voters?


The next section looks at where allies on the centre-left could come from - and how the numbers justify looking left to win.

PART 4

The progressive majority

The progressive majority - 1979 - 2024

The UK has long had a progressive majority amongst its electorate. The majority of British voters since 1979 have voted for left and centre-left political parties. But in that time the country has been governed almost relentlessly by centre-right or regressive governments.




Progressive Parties: Labour, Liberal Democrat, Green, Plaid Cymru
Regressive Parties: Conservative, Reform UK

Despite the prolonged dominance of the Conservative Party since 1979, at the 12 elections during this time, on average, there was a 52% majority of votes cast in favour of progressive parties (specifically, Labour, Liberal Democrats, Greens, and Plaid Cymru), while 57% voted for left-leaning parties (a wider left political field with SNP, SDLP, and Sinn Fein) according to [Parlgov data](#).

Looking internationally, the contrast between the way the UK votes and the government we get is stark. For the sake of this comparison, our sample group includes Canada, Australia, Ireland, Belgium, Iceland, Finland, Netherlands, Austria, Germany, France, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, and Switzerland.


Using a tool that scores the political leaning of parties based on a 0-10 scale where 0 = extreme left wing, 10 = extreme right wing, we can plot what's happened over the last 40 years in the UK. While this numerical scale was initially uniform, Stuart Donald updated this scale to account for political shifts over time.

Average persuasion of cabinets 1980 - 2020



Even though a significant portion of UK voters leaned towards left-leaning parties, on average 52%, the country has witnessed a prolonged period of governance by right-of-centre governments (nearly two thirds of the time), indicating the disparity between voter preferences and actual government composition. Despite UK voters having cast on average more votes for left of centre parties - comparatively more than any other country in the peer group - we have elected the most right-wing governments in this peer group.

In our calculation, in addition to the Labour Party, left and centre-left parties include the SNP, Plaid Cymru, the Greens, Sinn Fein, the SDLP and the Liberal Democrats.



The result of this is that we are more unhealthy, unhappy, and unequal than our peers. The UK is home to nine of the 10 poorest regions in northern Europe, yet is also home to the richest region in Europe.

On every count: income equality, housing availability and quality, education, pension levels, childcare costs, life expectancy, deaths from the COVID-19 pandemic, child mortality rate, literacy and numeracy levels above 16, the UK ranks consistently in the bottom 5 of [this peer group](#).

Of the 12 elections since 1979, eight of those resulted in Conservative-led governments. Our analysis shows that progressives could have prevented all eight majority Conservative governments just by backing the best-placed progressive to defeat the Tories in their constituency. In six of these cases (except 2015 and 2019), progressives could have even secured a majority themselves.

In the last 45 years, on average there were 104 “Progressive Tragedies” in every election. Britain has the most progressive voters in this peer group of countries but shockingly gets the most right wing governments - all because of FPTP.

To be clear, we are not suggesting that voters' preferences can simply be assumed and be racked up in either a progressive or regressive voting column or pushed from one party to another like beads on an abacus. Voters are complicated, often tactical rather than truthful, and motivated by a myriad of issues outside of specific candidates or manifestos.

Some centrist voters will undoubtedly vote Tory if they feel the outcome of any election is a likely Labour Prime Minister. But **as our polling shows, Liberal Democrat voters are 4 times more likely to vote for Labour than Conservative voters.** These voters could be persuaded to use their vote effectively if it held out the prospect of radical change.

What matters is the fact that this latent progressive majority **can** be mobilised to transform our country. Both the recognition of this potential progressive majority and its mobilisation are political acts. That is to say, the effective utilisation of this progressive majority demands serious political intent. It will not be easy as it demands that politicians and voters search for what they have in common, not what divides them. But building on the nation's latent progressive majority is the foundation for a new centre-left political project - while tacking endlessly to the right just emboldens and serves the right.

To get into the specific kinds of policies that could motivate support for the Labour government, we asked how the Labour Party's action on a number of policies would affect voters' support. The results are resoundingly in favour of progressive policies.


The two policies that emerged as those that could most woo voters nationally to support Labour are upgrading older homes to be more energy efficient and bringing the water network back into public ownership.

Next in popularity comes increasing taxes on wealth, such as raising taxes on high net-worth individuals and assets, removing means testing for the winter fuel allowance, switching electoral systems from first-past-the-post to proportional representation for Parliament, and abolishing the House of Lords in favour of an elected second chamber.

However, digging into the different types of voters' attitudes to these policies is revealing - and begins to hint at a direction of travel that could produce a policy program to court progressive voters of other parties.


Would the Labour party supporting upgrading older homes to be more energy efficient make you feel more favourable towards them?

■ All Voters ■ Labour Voters ■ Lib Dem Voters ■ Green Voters




Would the Labour party supporting bringing the water network back into public ownership make you feel more favourable towards them?

■ All ■ Labour Voters ■ Lib Dem Voters ■ Green Voters




Would the Labour party supporting increasing taxes on wealth make you feel more favourable towards them?

■ All ■ Labour Voters ■ Lib Dem Voters ■ Green Voters



Would the Labour party supporting changing the voting system to PR make you feel more favourable towards them?

■ All ■ Labour Voters ■ Lib Dem Voters ■ Green Voters



Moreover, progressives working together to deliver change is in itself very popular. A third of Labour voters want Labour to work more closely with the Liberal Democrats, and 27% want Labour to work more closely with the Greens. Amongst Liberal Democrat voters, 38% want their party to work more closely with Labour, 27% want their party to work more closely with the Greens. Green voters, similarly, want to see their party work with the other progressive parties - 28% want to see them work more closely with Labour, 30% want to see them work more closely with the Liberal Democrats.

Across those three groups of voters, working together is more popular than going it alone - sometimes by a factor of more than two.

To ensure an electoral coalition for the coming years to deliver on their plan for a decade of national renewal, Labour needs to appeal to the progressive majority rather than fighting for the tiny slither of Tory swing voters in marginals, who only back Labour when the Tories are unfit for office and when Labour rules out radical reform.

Delivering some services mildly better while inequality grows, children continue to go hungry, the housing market continues to extract the wealth of a bulk of the working population, our schools continue to struggle, and sewage pollutes our rivers, will facilitate the Conservatives' return and Reform's rise.

Here Labour should be warned. Progressives aren't the only voters keen to see cooperation to achieve their goals - there is also a desire among Conservative and Reform voters for their parties to work together in a 'regressive alliance' that could threaten Labour's electoral hopes:

- 40% of Reform voters want to see them work more closely with the Conservatives (this was the most popular combination of all the options)
- 39% of Conservative voters want to see them work more closely with Reform

More than twice as many Conservative voters want their party to work with Reform than with the Liberal Democrats (39% vs 16%). With the Conservatives under Kemi Badenoch reaching right, Labour is reaching into a colder voter base that has more appetite for cooperation with the right-wing. That is the wrong way.

2024 was a success story of Progressive Alliances - and regressive competition

Whatever else the 2024 General Election was, it is true that it resulted in the most MPs from left and centre-left parties ever elected. As well as a resounding success for Labour in the number of MPs, the Lib Dems and the Greens saw huge levels of success. Behind this success was a progressive alliance, it just looks a little different when dressed up as 'targeting'. This alliance was on two levels.

First, Labour and the Liberal Democrats relentlessly targeted their resources and focus. The map on page 35 compiled during the election using Labour's '[battleground seats](#)' and the Liberal Democrat target list clearly shows the extent to which they did not compete for the same votes.


The picture is complicated in Scotland where the SNP and Labour fought it out over Scotland's Central Belt, and in Bristol Central where the Greens challenged a Labour incumbent. However, just counting Labour and the Lib Dems, there were only a few seats where this non-aggression pact seemed not to apply - two in England (Wimbledon and Sheffield Hallam), one in Wales (Brecon, Radnor and Cwm Tawe), and two in Scotland (Inverness, Skye and West Ross-shire, and Mid Dunbartonshire).

In most non-target seats, both parties stood the thinnest of paper candidates in the hope that voters would get the message. Constituencies were twinned, and buses of volunteers shuffled around to their nearest target, helped by tactical vote messaging. In some non-battleground seats, the contracts Labour's candidates were told to sign stipulated that they were not to campaign and [if they did campaign, they would be reprimanded](#).

Of the 211 Labour 'battleground' areas, only seven saw competition from the Liberal Democrats and the Greens. This was undoubtedly effective. But if Labour continues its tactics of going it alone and maintaining FPTP, while defending a record in government, this non-aggression is unlikely to take place next time (with particular threats from the Greens and any SNP recovery).

This intense targeting is one of the perverse incentives of FPTP that left Nigel Farage to contest Clacton without a progressive alternative as Labour's candidate in the seat was told to campaign in the West Midlands. There are [grumbings that this tactic has already backfired ahead of the 2025 Local Elections](#) in which many local parties will be campaigning from scratch.

Labour Target Liberal Democrat Target Labour & Liberal Democrat Target Labour & Green Target Green Target



Source: Office for National Statistics (England & Wales boundaries), Boundary Commission for Scotland, Boundary Commission for Northern Ireland

The second progressive alliance was far away from party HQs, stirred up by the feeling that after 14 years, people had had enough and would vote whichever way they should to get the Tories out. This was a progressive alliance between voters themselves who voted tactically **against** their worst option. These are votes that are lent, and are extremely precarious. The likes of Compass, [Best for Britain](#), [The Movement Forward](#), [The Political Primary Network](#), and more saw unprecedented infrastructure and campaigning aimed at gaming and beating the FPTP system. In some seats, local parties, below the radar of their party HQs, ensured that their candidate stood down or didn't campaign.

It should be remembered here that these high levels of efficient tactical voting happened against the backdrop of:

- Widespread and deep dissatisfaction with the party of government and a huge drop in the Tory vote
- A determination to maximise the anti-Tory vote
- A Labour Party that didn't have to defend its record
- Deep divisions on the political right, which allowed 202 progressive candidates to win despite a larger number of Conservative and Reform voters

None of these factors are likely to be present or as strong at the next election.

Labour will be judged on its record of delivering on living standards and public services improvements. It will struggle to deliver precisely because it decided to win with only a weak mandate for change.

Labour could fight the next election against the backdrop of a devastating political pincer movement between:

- A revived Tory Party and stronger Reform party that do a deal to ensure the regressive vote is maximised; and,
- A resilient Lib Dem party, a much stronger Green Party and a networked independent movement, as well as any revival of the SNP, all fuelled by any view that Labour has failed to deliver the change it promised.

Conclusion

The art of politics lies in assembling coalitions of voters that enable a party to win **and** deliver change. Compass' polling shows that Labour's greatest vulnerability is that its 2024 voters drift to the Greens and Liberal Democrats. Labour could marshal these voters through a progressive policy agenda on issues like a wealth tax and democratic reform. Labour's safest future electoral strategy is to consolidate and rally these voters and dislodge some Reform voters who want real economic and democratic change.

But these parties, the members, activists and voters are less and less likely to rally to Labour without the cast iron promise of electoral reform - otherwise it's just a case of rinse and repeat of the same coercive demand to back Labour as 'the least worst option'. If that is the offer then more voters will stay at home or back smaller parties.

Considerable numbers of Labour seats are razor-edge marginals that are vulnerable to slight changes in turnout and voter churn. Elections since 2015 have shown that decisive shifts in a party's support can happen swiftly and dramatically, amplified by the First Past The Post system. In 2019 Labour was written off for two elections at least. Look at how fast that changed.

A proportional electoral system is not only in the country's interest but is in Labour's self-interest. PR allows the progressive majority of voters' preferences to be fully expressed, not just electorally but politically, through a progressive policy agenda. Only by winning on a progressive mandate will the country get the future it needs and wants.

In an age of political earthquakes it's best not to skate on such thin ice.

Appendix

202 'regressive tragedy' seats

Aberdeenshire North and Moray East
Aldershot
Altrincham and Sale West
Alyn and Deeside
Amber Valley
Ashford
Ashton-under-Lyne
Aylesbury
Banbury
Barnsley North
Barnsley South
Barrow and Furness
Bassetlaw
Bexleyheath and Crayford
Bicester and Woodstock
Birmingham Erdington
Birmingham Northfield
Bishop Auckland
Blackpool North and Fleetwood
Blackpool South
Blyth and Ashington
Bolsover
Bolton North East
Bolton South and Walkden
Bolton West
Bournemouth East
Bournemouth West
Bracknell
Bradford South
Brecon, Radnor and Cwm Tawe
Buckingham and Bletchley
Burton and Uttoxeter
Bury North
Bury St Edmunds and Stowmarket
Camborne and Redruth
Cannock Chase
Carlisle
Chatham and Aylesford
Chelmsford
Chelsea and Fulham
Chipping Barnet
Cities of London and Westminster
Clwyd East
Clwyd North
Colne Valley
Congleton
Corby and East Northamptonshire
Crawley
Dagenham and Rainham
Darlington
Dartford
Derby South
Derbyshire Dales
Didcot and Wantage
Doncaster East and the Isle of Axholme
Dorking and Horley
Dover and Deal
Dudley
Dunstable and Leighton Buzzard
Easington
East Thanet
Eastleigh
Ely and East Cambridgeshire
Epsom and Ewell
Erewash
Folkestone and Hythe
Forest of Dean
Frome and East Somerset
Gillingham and Rainham
Glastonbury and Somerton
Gloucester
Gravesham
Great Grimsby and Cleethorpes
Halesowen
Halifax
Harlow
Hartlepool
Hemel Hempstead
Hendon
Hertford and Stortford
Heywood and Middleton North
Horsham
Houghton and Sunderland South
Hyndburn
Isle of Wight West
Jarrow and Gateshead East
Kettering
Kingston upon Hull East
Leigh and Atherton
Lichfield
Llanelli
Loughborough
Lowestoft
Makerfield
Mansfield
Melksham and Devizes

Merthyr Tydfil and Aberdare
Mid and South Pembrokeshire
Mid Derbyshire
Milton Keynes North
Monmouthshire
Montgomeryshire and Glyndŵr
Moray West, Nairn and Strathspey
Morecambe and Lunesdale
Neath and Swansea East
Newbury
Newcastle upon Tyne Central and West
Newton Abbot
Newton Aycliffe and Spennymoor
Normanton and Hemsworth
North Devon
North Durham
North East Derbyshire
North East Hampshire
North East Hertfordshire
North East Somerset and Hanham
North Herefordshire
North Norfolk
North Northumberland
North Somerset
North Warwickshire and Bedworth
North West Cambridgeshire
North West Leicestershire
Northampton South
Nuneaton
Oldham East and Saddleworth
Ossett and Denby Dale
Pendle and Clitheroe
Penistone and Stocksbridge
Penrith and Solway
Peterborough
Plymouth Moor View
Pontefract, Castleford and Knottingley
Poole
Portsmouth North
Rawmarsh and Conisbrough
Reading West and Mid Berkshire
Redcar
Redditch
Rhondda and Ogmore
Ribble Valley
Rochester and Strood
Rossendale and Darwen
Rother Valley
Rotherham
Rugby

Scarborough and Whitby
Scunthorpe
Sherwood Forest
Sittingbourne and Sheppey
South Cotswolds
South Derbyshire
South Dorset
South East Cornwall
South Norfolk
South Ribble
South Shields
South West Norfolk
Southampton Itchen
Southend East and Rochford
Southend West and Leigh
Southport
Spen Valley
St Austell and Newquay
St Neots and Mid Cambridgeshire
Stafford
Stevenage
Stockton North
Stoke-on-Trent Central
Stoke-on-Trent North
Stoke-on-Trent South
Stourbridge
Stratford-on-Avon
Suffolk Coastal
Sunderland Central
Surrey Heath
Sutton and Cheam
Swindon North
Tamworth
Telford
Thornbury and Yate
Thurrock
Tipton and Wednesbury
Tiverton and Minehead
Torbay
Torfaen
Uxbridge and South Ruislip
Vale of Glamorgan
Warrington North
Washington and Gateshead South
Watford
Waveney Valley
Wellingborough and Rushden
Welwyn Hatfield
Weston-super-Mare
Wigan

Witney
Wolverhampton North East
Worthing West
Wrexham
Wycombe
Ynys Môn

98 seats where Reform is in second place

Aberafan Maesteg	Leigh and Atherton
Alyn and Deeside	Liverpool Garston
Amber Valley	Liverpool Walton
Ashton-under-Lyne	Liverpool West Derby
Barking	Llanelli
Barnsley North	Louth and Horncastle
Barnsley South	Makerfield
Birmingham Erdington	Maldon
Blackley and Middleton South	Merthyr Tydfil and Aberdare
Blackpool South	Middlesbrough and Thornaby East
Blaydon and Consett	Montgomeryshire and Glyndŵr
Blyth and Ashington	Neath and Swansea East
Bolton South and Walkden	Newcastle upon Tyne East and Wallsend
Bootle	Newcastle upon Tyne North
Bradford South	Newport East
Brentwood and Ongar	Newport West and Islwyn
Bridgend	Newton Aycliffe and Spennymoor
Castle Point	Normanton and Hemsworth
City of Durham	North Durham
Coventry East	North East Cambridgeshire
Cramlington and Killingworth	Nottingham North and Kimberley
Dagenham and Rainham	Oldham East and Saddleworth
Derby South	Plymouth Sutton and Devonport
Dover and Deal	Pontefract, Castleford and Knottingley
Easington	Pontypridd
Ellesmere Port and Bromborough	Portsmouth South
Erith and Thamesmead	Rawmarsh and Conisbrough
Gateshead Central and Whickham	Rayleigh and Wickford
Gorton and Denton	Rhondda and Ogmore
Great Grimsby and Cleethorpes	Rotherham
Hartlepool	Runcorn and Helsby
Heywood and Middleton North	Salford
Hornchurch and Upminster	Smethwick
Houghton and Sunderland South	South Holland and The Deepings
Isle of Wight East	South Shields
Jarrow and Gateshead East	Spen Valley
Kingston upon Hull East	St Helens North
Kingston upon Hull North and Cottingham	St Helens South and Whiston
Kingston upon Hull West and Haltemprice	Stalybridge and Hyde
Knowsley	Stockport
Leeds East	Stockton North

Stoke-on-Trent Central
Sunderland Central
Swansea West
Telford
Thurrock
Torfaen
Wakefield and Rothwell
Wallasey
Warrington North

Washington and Gateshead South
Whitehaven and Workington
Widnes and Halewood
Wigan
Wolverhampton South East
Worsley and Eccles
Wythenshawe and Sale East

40 seats where the Greens are in second place

Birkenhead
Bristol East
Bristol North East
Bristol North West
Bristol South
Cardiff South and Penarth
Chorley
Dulwich and West Norwood
Greenwich and Woolwich
Hackney North and Stoke Newington
Hackney South and Shoreditch
Hornsey and Friern Barnet
Hove and Portslade
Huddersfield
Islington South and Finsbury
Leeds Central and Headingley
Leeds South West and Morley
Lewisham East

Lewisham North
Lewisham West and East Dulwich
Leyton and Wanstead
Liverpool Riverside
Liverpool Wavertree
Manchester Central
Manchester Rusholme
Manchester Withington
Norwich South
Nottingham East
Oxford East
Peckham
Poplar and Limehouse
Queen's Park and Maida Vale
Sheffield Brightside and Hillsborough
Sheffield Central
Sheffield Heeley
Stratford and Bow

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
The New Settlement: For a Better Society

Almost everyone recognises that we are at a turning point. Unless we transform our economy and our democracy, we will face a downward spiral.

The 2024 General Election result brings a welcome relief to UK politics. Some better ideas and people are at the helm. But we desperately need a new paradigm. *The New Settlement: For a Better Society* seeks to establish the guiding principles and building blocks of a society that is much more equal, democratic and sustainable.

After the Riots

The aftermath of the recent riots leaves a country grappling with deep-seated issues that extend far beyond the immediate violence. The sickening flames of the riots may have burned themselves out, but the embers of hatred, frustration, and alienation still shimmer under the ashes. The violence has subsided for now, but it's not hard to see, given the context, how something similar, worse even, might arise again - and soon.



Without a comprehensive response, we risk falling into a pattern of "sticking plaster politics," where the true causes of unrest are neglected. This report delves into some of the root causes of these riots, including economic disparity, cultural tensions, and political disillusionment, and asks how we can prevent future unrest.



New Horizons: Reconsidering Britain's Role in the World

Britain urgently needs to redefine its purpose on the world stage. In a world marked by escalating crises — climate change, inequality, authoritarianism, and conflict— the challenge at hand is huge.

In *New Horizons: Reconsidering Britain's Role in the World*, Clare Short, former Labour MP and Secretary of State for International Development from 1997-2003, takes a critical look at the UK's current foreign policy and suggest how we can take a more constructive role on the global stage.


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We believe in a world that is much more equal, sustainable and democratic. We build alliances of ideas, parties and movements to help make systemic change happen.


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